Osama Bin Laden
July 10, 2011 by staff
Hidden from view, standing outside the frame of the now-famous photograph, was a CIAanlyst career. In the struggle for the world’s most wanted terrorists, could have been more important. His work for almost a decade was to find the leader of al-Qaida.
Theanlyst was the first to write last summer that the CIA could be a legitimate advantage in the search for bin Laden. He oversaw the collection of clues that led the agency to a fortified compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan. His was one of the most trusted voices telling Obama bin Laden was probably behind those walls.
The CIA was not allowed to speak to reporters. But interviews with intelligence officials and former U.S. reveal a history of quiet persistence and continuity that led to the fight against t*rror*sm the greatest success in the history of the CIA. Almost all the officials insisted on anonymity because they were not authorized to speak to the media or because they want their names linked to bin laden operation.
The Associated Press has agreed to ask the CIA not to publish your full name and retain certain biographical data that does not become a target for revenge.
He is called John, his middle name. John was one of hundreds of people poured into the Countert*rror*sm Center of the CIA after the Sept. 11 attacks, bringing fresh eyes and energy to fight.
“I always could give the broader implications of all these details accumulate,” said John McLaughlin, who as deputy director of the CIA was regularly informed by John after the 2001 attacks.
Since 2003, when he joined the Centre against t*rror*sm until 2005, John was one of the initiators of the chain’s most successful arrest of t*rror*sm in the fight against t*rror*sm: Abu Zubaydah, Abd al-Nashiri Khalid Sheik Mohammed, Ramzi bin Alshib, Hambali and Faraj al-Libi.
But there was no jackpot that the hunt for bin Laden.
Bin Laden had slipped away from U.S. forces in the Afghan mountains of Tora Bora in 2001; the CIA believed that they had taken refuge in lawless tribal areas of Pakistan. In 2006, the agency Cannonball operation mounted an effort to establish bases in the tribal regions and find Bin Laden. Despite all their money and resources, the CIA could not find the main objective.
By then, the agency was in its third director since September 11, 2001. John had outlived many of their direct supervisors who retired or went to other jobs. The CIA likes to keep his people in one place for long. Become obsolete. They start missing things.
The CIA offered to promote and move elsewhere. John wanted to keep the file bin Laden.
Was reviewed and reconsidered all aspects of the life of Bin Laden. What is life while hiding in Sudan? Who do you surround yourself while living in Kandahar, Afghanistan? What would a hideout of Bin Laden look like today?
The CIA had a list of potential customers, partners and family members who may have access to bin Laden.
“We have to work little by little the list,” a senior intelligence official says John told his team. “He’s there somewhere. We will get there.”
John rose through the ranks of the countert*rror*sm center, but due to its almost unparalleled experience, has always had influence beyond its title. A former chief confessed that he knew exactly what the position of John was.
“I knew he was the man in the room who always listened,” he said.
In 2007, a co-worker that the AP also has agreed not to identify decided to focus on a man known as Abu Ahmed al-Kuwait, a nom de guerre. Other terrorists had identified al-Kuwait as an important courier upper echelon of Al-Qaeda and believed it could help lead to finding bin Laden.
“They had their teeth at this and would not let go,” said John McLaughlin and his team. “This was an obsession.”
It took three years, but in August 2010, al-Kuwait recording appeared on a National Security Agency. Theanlyst gave women a memorandum of John, “Closing the messenger of Bin Laden”, saying his team believes that al-Kuwaiti was on the outskirts of Islamabad.
As the CIA focused on al-Kuwait, the team of John continually updates the memo with fresh information. The hunt for al-Kuwait was actually searching for Bin Laden and who was not afraid to say so.
CIA Director, Leon Panetta, I wanted to know more. John never overpromised, colleagues recalled, but he was not afraid to say it had a good chance that this could be a great opportunity for the agency.
The CIA monitoring al-Kuwait a walled in Abbottabad. If Bin Laden is hiding there, in a busy suburb, not far from the Pakistan Military Academy, which challenged most of what the agency had taken on his hideout.
However, John said it was not so farfetched. Based on what I knew about the hideouts of Bin Laden before he said it made sense that bin Laden was surrounded only with e-mails and family and not use telephones or the Internet. The CIA knew that al-Qaida had lived in urban areas before.
Panetta a cautious Obama took the information, but there was much work to do.
The government tried to find out everything that was in the compound.
Again and again, John and his team asked who else might be living in that compound. They came with five or six alternatives; Bin Laden was always the best explanation.
John was always optimistic, rating their confidence as much as 80 percent.
But everyone knew the risk that the CIA was taking when he told the President that Bin Laden was in Abbottabad and wrong. “We all knew that if he was not there and was a disaster, would certainly have consequences,” he recalled.
John was one of several CIA officials repeatedly said that Obama and others in the White House. Officials and former officials involved in the discussions said John had a freshness and confidence reassuring.
In April, the president had decided to send the Navy SEALs to assault the compound.
In the Situation Room, theanlyst who was barely known outside the intelligence world together took his place alongside the officials of the nation’s maximum security, the names of the home and familiar faces from Washington.
An agonizing 40 minutes after Navy SEALs stormed the compound, the report came back: Bin Laden was dead.
Two days after the death of Bin Laden accompanied John Panetta to the Capitol. The Senate Intelligence Committee wanted a full report on the success of the mission. At a time when the closed session, Panetta turned to the man who fights against t*rror*sm resume included four directors of the CIA.
He started talking on the operation and the years of intelligence that are based on. And as he spoke of the mission that had become his career, calm, collectedanlyst stopped, and was excited.
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